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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

:

RICHARD ALVIN LIKES,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 890544-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of burglary of a
business, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-202 (1978), in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and
for Millard County, State of Utah, the Honorable Cullen Y.
Christensen, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was defendant's sixth amendment right to confront

witnesses against him violated?
2.

Did defendant's confession, admitted at trial,

violate defendant's right not to testify against himself and was
that confession voluntary?
Although defendant was convicted of theft, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978), a second degree felony pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(b)(i) (1978) (amended 1989), as well
as burglary of a business, he has chosen to appeal only the
burglary conviction. Judgment was entered in accordance with the
two convictions on August 23, 1989 (R. 131-136).

3.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

motion to suppress evidence?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. IV i
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defense.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Richard Alvin Likes, was charged with
burglary of a business and theft (R. 10, 11)* Defendant filed
motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant
based on the belief the evidence was not in plain view (R. 2627).

Defendant also moved to suppress defendant's "alleged

confession" (R. 26-27, 29-30).

The trial court denied

defendant's motion(s) (R. 53-58, T. 216). Defendant was
convicted on both counts after a jury trial (R. 151-52, case fi
no. 1085, State of Utah v. Kevin Jon Nield).
only the burglary conviction.
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Defendant appeals

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of May 16, 1988, at approximately 9:30
to 10:00 p.m., Gerald Freeman, the owner of Fillmore Diesel,
Fillmore, Utah, received information that his business might be
burglarized that night (T. 122). He called the Millard County
Sheriff's Department and asked for an extra patrol that evening
(T. 82, 122). Deputy Sheriff Scott Corry received Mr. Freeman's
call at 10:00 p.m. and checked the diesel shop at midnight.

At

that time he found the doors locked and secured (T. 83). When he
returned at 2:30 a.m. on May 17, he found that the chain link
securing the west bay doors had been cut (T. 84). He called Mr.
Freeman, who immediately came to the shop and began to determine
what had been taken (T. 86, 127). During his initial
investigation of the burglary, Deputy Corry took photographs of
two sets of greasy footprints left on the concrete floor of the
shop (T. 86-87).
Later that morning (May 17) Deputy Corry spoke with Mr.
Freeman, who was then able to give him a preliminary list of
missing items.

That list included a sander, mig welder, power

tools and hand tools (Suppression Hearing (S.H.) 37; T. 127).
Because of the size of the shop and the many tools used there, a
complete inventory of stolen items was not completed until May 18
or 19 (S.H. 36; T. 28). Later on May 17 Mr. Freeman received
information that he could find his missing tools at Kevin Nield's
apartment (S.H. 48-49).

He contacted Deputy Corry who obtained a

search warrant for Mr. Nield's apartment and several vehicles.
The description of the property subject to seizure under the
search warrant was as follows:
-3-

shop equipment, air tools, mig welder, desk
calculator, auto tools stolen from Gerald D.
Freeman, Fillmore Diesel, Fillmore, Utah on
5/17/88 during a burglary.
(R. 9). At 12:15 a.m. on May 18, Deputy Corry searched the Nield
apartment and seized numerous items, including a pair of 18 inch
bolt cutters, which were found in the clothes closet in the front
room of the apartment (R. 12; S.H. 9, 20; T. 88, 90). Defendant,
who was then living in the Nield apartment, and Kevin Nield (codefendant) were then arrested and charged with burglary and
theft.

Mr. Freeman subsequently identified the bolt cutters as

possibly his, since he was required by state law to have bolt
cutters for his wreckers, and he had found an 18 inch set missing
from one of his vehicles (S.H. 39-40; T. 129-30).
After defendant's arrest he was taken to the Millard
County Jail, where he spent the remainder of the night (T. 204).
At approximately 1:00 p.m. on May 18, Deputy Corry began
interviewing defendant concerning the Fillmore Diesel burglary
(T. 206). In the course of the interview, which lasted
approximately three and one-half hours, defendant confessed that
the co-defendant and he had broken into Fillmore Diesel, had
taken several items and had hidden them in the Fillmore area (T.
210, 222). Defendant filed a motion to suppress his confession,
arguing generally that the confession was not voluntary (R. 2628).

At trial the court heard testimony and argument on

defendant's motion, made factual findings and denied the motion
(T. 216).
Defendant also filed a motion to suppress the seized
bolt cutters, arguing that they were not in plain view in the co-

defendant's apartment (R. 26-27).

After a hearing on the motion
2

to suppress, the trial court denied the motion (R. 53-58).
At the joint trial of defendant and co-defendant Nield#
the bolt cutters were admitted along with testimony from an
expert from the Utah State Crime Laboratory positively
identifying the bolt cutters as those that had been used to cut
the chain link at Fillmore Diesel (T. 55). The State also
offered into evidence a pair of gym shoes taken from defendant.
Deputy Corry identified their tread design as being "similar or
the same" as the tread on the footprints he photographed at
Fillmore Diesel on the night of the burglary (T. 96). Also
received into evidence were a sander, two jack stands and a mig
welder, found in a box underneath a pile of "junk" in the shed
behind the Nield apartment in October 1988, and turned over to
the sheriff on January 5, 1989 (T. 98-100, 243-49).

Mr. Freeman

positively identified the mig welder as his and testified that he
believed the jack stands and sanders were also his because they
looked like his, they were found with the mig welder and his were
The trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress is captioned
with only co-defendant Kevin Jon Nield's name, but it includes
defendant's criminal case number, 1082 (R. 59). Defendant did
not argue his "plain view" position at the suppresssion hearing
and did not submit a memorandum in support of his motion. The
co-defendant argued that the search warrant used to seize the
bolt cutters lacked sufficient particularity. The court heard
oral argument on that issue at the suppression hearing, and the
co-defendant filed a memorandum in support of his motion (Record
of Co-defendant at 66-71). Consequently, the trial court's
ruling addressed only the particularity issue. Nevertheless,
defendant's case number was captioned in the ruling and defendant
apparently accepts the fact that his motion to suppress was
denied. Therefore, the State, in its argument, assumes the fact
of the denial of defendant's motion to suppress the bolt cutters.
See Point III, infra.

still missing (T. 133-34).
Deputy Corry testified concerning his interview of
defendant after his arrest and recounted defendant's confession
(T. 222).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's admission of testimony concerning
defendant's confession did not violate the sixth amendment
because defendant fully cross-examined the witness who took the
confession.
The trial court properly admitted the testimony
concerning defendant's confession, correctly ruling that the
confession was voluntary.
The trial court properly admitted the seized bolt
cutters.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY
CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION DID NOT
VIOLATE THE SIXTH AMENDMENT.
Defendant seemingly argues that the introduction of his
confession at trial without the opportunity to fully crossexamine Deputy Corry, who took the confession, violates the sixth
3
amendment to the United States Constitution. (Br. of App. at 6).
3
Points I and III of defendant's brief are identical to Points I
and II, respectively, of his co-defendant, Kevin Nield's,
appellate brief, filed previously in this Court. Co-defendant
Nield's argument was responded to fully by the State in a brief
which is attached hereto as Addendum A and incorporated herein.
That argument attacked the admission at trial of defendant Likes'
confession, as testified to by Deputy Corry, as being a violation
of co-defendant Nield's right to confront witnesses against him,
i.e. defendant Likes, who declined to testify. Such an argument

-6-

That argument is not supported by the record.

Defendant had

ample opportunity to cross-examine Deputy Corry at trial, and he
did so (T. 223-28)•

Defendant's assertion is meritless.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED TESTIMONY
CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION.
Defendant argues that his confession, admitted at
trial, was done so in violation of his rights not to testify
against himself, as found in Utah Const, art. I, § 12 and Utah
Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1982) (Br. of App. at 14). However,
defendant failed to assert that ground for suppression below, and
an appellate court in this state will not entertain such an
objection for the first time on appeal.
P.2d 326 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted,

In State v. Johnson, 771
P.2d

(Utah

1989), this Court stated that "where a defendant fails to assert
a particular ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence
in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider that
ground on appeal."

Ld. at 328 (quoting State v. Carter, 707 P.2d

656, 660 (Utah 1985)).

See also State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53

(Utah) cert, denied 454 U.S. 1057 (1981) ("There is nothing in
the record to indicate that the point now urged upon this Court
was unavailable or unknown to defendant at the time he filed his
motion to suppress, and to entertain the point now would be to
sanction the practice of withholding positions that should
properly be presented to the trial court but which may be

Cont. is utterly inapplicable to the instant case and requires
no analytical response.

withheld for the purpose of seeking a reversal on appeal and a
new trial or dismissal•").
Defendant further argues that his confession was
coerced and not voluntary (Br, of App. at 14). However,
defendant cites no authority in support of his position and
provides no legal analysis.

Rule 24(a)(9) of both the Utah

Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals states that an
appellate brief "shall contain the contentions of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented and the reasons therefore,
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied on."

In State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344

(Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court declined to rule on an issue
because the defendant had "fail[ed] to support his argument by
any legal analysis or authority."

See also State v. Wareham, 772

P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (footnote omitted) ("A brief must
contain some support for each contention.

[Defendant's] brief

totally fails to provide any reasons to support [his] contention.
. . . We therefore must disregard this issue."); State v.
Pascoe, 774 P.2d 512, 514 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[A]ppellant
failed to support his [this] contention with legal analysis or
authority.

We, therefore, decline to rule on it.").

Because

defendant fails to substantively argue his position, the Court
has no basis from which to evaluate or rule on his contention.
Should this Court consider the merits of defendant's
contention, the Utah Supreme Court has established the standard
applicable for reviewing the "voluntariness" of a confession.

In

State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989), the Court stated that

the State has the burden of proving that a defendant's confession
was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence and that
voluntariness is determined by the totality of the circumstances.
Id. at 890 (citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463-64 (Utah
1988)).

Absent clear error or abuse of discretion a trial

court's ruling will not be reversed.
385, 392 (Utah 1986).

State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d

See also State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348,

1349 (Utah 1986).
In the instant case Deputy Corry, who interviewed
defendant and took his confession, testified concerning that
interview.

He stated that defendant had been arrested between

1:30 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. on May 17 [sic] (the arrest was actually
made on May 18), taken to the Millard County Jail and booked and
put in a holding cell (T. 203-04).

The facility was heated, a

bed was available and defendant had access to restrooms up until
the time of the interview later on May 18 (T. 204-06).

Deputy

Corry testified that defendant would have had two opportunities
to eat prior to the 1:00 p.m. interview, a morning meal at 8:00
a.m. and a noon meal (T. 205). The interview took place at the
Millard County Security Center in a room approximately 10 feet by
14 feet and lasted approximately three and one-half hours (T.
205-06, 211). Defendant appeared alert to Deputy Corry at the
time of the interview, and his Miranda rights were read to him
prior to the start of the interview (T. 207). Deputy Corry
stated that defendant confessed within the first 40 minutes of
the interview and that no breaks were taken during the duration
of the interview (R. 211). When defendant requested an attorney,

-9-

the interview ceased (T. 215). Defendant declined to testify,
and he offered no other evidence rebutting deputy Corry's
testimony.
The trial court made the following findings:
Well, it appears to the Court in this
circumstance as to the voluntariness of the
alleged statement, it doesn't appear to the
Court that circumstances of the arrest of the
defendant or the interview of the defendant
was [sic] unreasonable. It appears he had an
opportunity to terminate the interview, in
fact ultimately did. That he was not held in
any unreasonable circumstances. He was given
the Miranda warning prior to any discussion
being undertaken. He agreed to talk with the
officer.
(R. 216). Based on those findings, the trial court denied
defendant's motion to suppress.

In light of the unrebutted

evidence that the State offered, the trial court did not clearly
err or abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE
EVIDENCE DEFENDANT CHALLENGES ON APPEAL.
As noted supra, defendant's Point III here is identical
to co-defendant Nield's Point II in his appeal.

The State

responded fully to that assertion in its brief in co-defendant's
case.

That argument is attached hereto as Addendum A.

However,

defendant failed to assert the "warrant particularity" issue
below.

In his motion to suppress, defendant argued only that the

bolt cutters in question were not in plain view in the codefendant's apartment (R. 26-27).

As noted supraf defendant's

failure to assert a particular ground for suppression below
precludes an appellate court from considering that ground on
appeal.

See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328.
-10-

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction
should be affirmed.
DATED this

2 &

day of March, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

^-JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Milton T. Harmon, attorney for defendant, 36 South Main Street,
P.O. Box 97, Nephi, Utah

84648, this P-& day of March, 1990.

Q^JUrJ^fb^t^
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No- 890465-CA

v.
Category No. 2

KEVIN NIELD,
Defendant-Appellant•

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of burglary of a
business, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-202 (1978), in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and
for Millard County, State of Utah, the Honorable Cullen Y.
Christensen, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENT ON APPEAL
Defendant's issues on appeal are whether defendant's
sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against him was
violated and whether the trial court properly denied defendant's
motion to suppress evidence.

Although defendant was convicted of theft, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978), a second degree felony pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(b)(i) (1978) (amended 1989), as well
as burglary of a business, he has chosen to appeal only the
burglary conviction. Judgment was entered in accordance with the
two convictions on August 23, 1989 (R. 216-221).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported byOath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. Vis
In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defense.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendant, Kevin Jon Nield, was charged with burglary
of a business and theft (R. 3, 4). Defendant filed a motion to
suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant based on
the belief that the warrant description of property to be seized
was insufficiently particular (R. 30-32).

The trial court denied

defendant's motion, and defendant was convicted on both counts
after a jury trial (R. 151-52).

Defendant appeals only the

burglary conviction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of May 16, 1988, at approximately 9:30
to 10:00 p.m., Gerald Freeman, the owner of Fillmore Diesel,
Fillmore, Utah, received information that his business might be

burglarized that night (T. 122). He called the Millard County
Sheriff's Department and asked for an extra patrol that evening
(T. 82, 122). Deputy Sheriff Scott Corry received Mr. Freeman's
call at 10:00 p.m. and checked the diesel shop at midnight. At
that time he found the doors locked and secured (T. 83). When he
returned at 2:30 a.m. on May 17, he found that the chain link
securing the west bay doors had been cut (T. 84). He called Mr.
Freeman, who immediately came to the shop and began to determine
what had been taken (T. 86, 127). During his initial
investigation of the burglary, Deputy Corry took photographs of
two sets of greasy footprints left on the concrete floor of the
shop (T. 86-87).
Later that morning (May 17) Deputy Corry spoke with Mr.
Freeman, who was then able to give him a preliminary list of
missing items.

That list included a sander, mig welder, power

tools and hand tools (Suppression Hearing (S.H.) 37; T. 127).
Because of the size of the shop and the many tools used there, a
complete inventory of stolen items was not completed until May 18
or 19 (S.H. 36; T. 28). Later on May 17 Mr. Freeman received
information that he could find his missing tools at defendant's
apartment (S.H. 48-49).

He contacted Deputy Corry who obtained a

search warrant for defendant's apartment and several vehicles.
The description of the property subject to seizure under the
search warrant was as follows:
shop equipment, air tools, mig welder, desk
calculator, auto tools stolen from Gerald D.
Freeman, Fillmore Diesel, Fillmore, Utah on
5/17/88 during a burglary.

(R. 9). At 12:15 a.m. on May 18, Deputy Corry searched
defendant's apartment and seized numerous items, including a pair
of 18 inch bolt cutters, which were found in the clothes-eloset
in the front room of the apartment (R. 12; S.H. 9, 20; T. 88,
90).

Defendant and co-defendant Richard Alvin Likes were then

arre'sted and charged with burglary and theft.

Mr, Freeman

subsequently identified the bolt cutters as possibly his, since
he was required by state law to have bolt cutters for his
wreckers, and he had found an 18 inch set missing from one of his
vehicles (S.H. 39-40; T. 129-30).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the bolt cutters,
arguing that the warrant under which they were seized lacked the
requisite particularity (R. 30-31).

Af-':er a hearing on the

motion to suppress, the trial court denied the motion.
so it issued extensive, specific findings of fact.

In doing

The court

found that Mr. Freeman maintained a shop filled with "all types
of small and large tools including hand tools, power tools, air
tools and equipment of all types" needed to repair heavy
equipment and that on the night of the burglary he was able to
point out "several more significant items of equipment . . .
missing such as a mig welder and • . . [a] desk calculator but
. . was not able to identify each specific item of tools [sic]
because of the large inventory and numerous types" he kept (R.
58-9)•

It found that Mr. Freeman could not tell specifically

what was missing until he did a complete inventory and that in
the meantime Mr. Freeman was informed that some of his "stuff"
could be found in defendant's apartment (R. 59-60).
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The court

further found that Mr. Freeman reported the information to Deputy
Corry "who proceeded to obtain a search warrant on May 11* 1988,
with the best information he had, i.e., the description of the
type of tools and specific items of equipment furnished by Mr.
Freeman, short of a formal inventory" (R. 60). It found that
Deputy Corry and Mr. Freeman had determined that at the time of
the burglary access to the shop had been gained by cutting a
chain securing the shop doors and that at the time of the search
warrant execution Mr. Freeman did not know that he was missing
bolt cutters since that item was customarily kept in a tow track
(R. 60). The court found that when he was advised that bolt
cutters had been found in defendant's apartment, Mr. Freeman
checked his tow truck and determined that bolt cutters were
missing and stated that the seized bolt cutters looked like the
one'E missing from his truck (R. 60-61).

The court found that

the bolt cutters were capable of cutting the chain securing the
doors of Mr. Freeman's shop (R. 61). Finally, the court found
that Mr. Freeman had not been able to make an inventory to
determine the missing tools until the day following the burglary
and after the search warrant was executed. (R. 60).
At the joint trial of defendant and co-defendant Likes,
the bolt cutters were admitted along with testimony from an
expert from the Utah State Crime Laboratory positively
identifying the bolt cutters as those that had been used to cut
the chain link at Fillmore Diesel (T. 55). The State also
offered into evidence a pair of work boots taken from defendant.
Deputy Corry identified their tread design as being "very

similar" to the tread on the footprints he photographed at
Fillmore Diesel on the night of the burglary (T. 95). Also
received into evidence were a sander, two jack stands and a mig
welder, found in a box underneath a pile of "junk" in the shed
behind defendant's apartment in October, 1988, and turned over to
the sheriff on January 5, 1989 (T. 98-100, 243-49).

Mr. Freeman

positively identified the mig welder as his and testified that he
believed the jack stands and sanders were also his because they
looked like his, they were found with the mig welder and his were
still missing (T. 133-34).

Angie Carpenter, an acquaintance of

defendant, testified that defendant had told her prior to the
burglary and theft that he was going to break into Gerald
Freeman's shop and take what he could "get ahold [sic] of" to get
even with him (T. 164-65).

She further testified that on the

morning after the burglary defendant told her he had broken into
Mr. Freeman's shop and taken some equipment (T. 166-67).
During the trial Deputy Corry testified concerning his
interrogation of co-defendant Likes after his arrest.

During the

interrogation the co-defendant had confessed to the burglary and
theft and, in doing so, had also implicated defendant.

At trial,

the co-defendant declined to testify, and Deputy Corry recounted
the co-defendant's admission to him as it related to the codefendant's involvement in the burglary and theft (T. 222).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly admitted testimony concerning
the co-defendant's confession as not being a violation of
defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against
him.
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The trial court properly admitted evidence seized
pursuant to a valid search warrant.

Even if the warrant were

deemed technically insufficient as to certain evidence seized,
the evidence could have been properly seized under the plain view
doctrine.

Finally, if the evidence in question is deemed to have

been improperly admitted, there was other evidence sufficient to
support defendant's conviction, and the error was harmless.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED TESTIMONY
OF THE CO-DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION AS NOT BEING
VIOLATIVE OF DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.
Defendant argues that his right to confront witnesses
against him, as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 12 and Utah
2
Constitution,
was violated in the instant case when the trial
court permitted the introduction of evidence of his codefendant's confession at their joint trial.

Defendant premises

his argument on the assumption that the co-defendant's confession
was introduced as evidence against defendant and expressly
implicated and powerfully incriminated him in the commission of
the crime for which they were being tried. (Br. of App. at 9).
That premise cannot be supported in light of the facts of the
2
At trial, defendant limited his argument to guarantees secured
under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Since the application of independent state grounds to dispose of
the issue was not argued at the trial level, introduction of such
an argument is precluded on appeal. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d
326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Accordingly, the State will not
analyze defendant's confrontation issue under article I, section
12 of the Utah Constitution.

case.

A review of the testimony in question and counsels'

lengthy arguments that preceded its admission will clarify the
factual posture of this case and dispose of defendant's sixth
amendment argument.
At trial the State sought to allow Deputy Scott Corry
to testify concerning co-defendant Likes' confession, received
during interrogation, that defendant and he had committed the
crime in question.

Although the co-defendant's confession was

admissible against himself as an exception to the hearsay rule,
all parties were concerned that the testimony would not "wash
over" and implicate defendant (T. 182-196).

In determining

whether the co-defendant's confession could be admitted, the
trial court reviewed both United States Supreme Court and Utah
cases.
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S, 123 (1968), a
postal inspector testified at the defendant's and co-defendant's
joint trial that the co-defendant had orally confessed to him
that both the defendant and the co-defendant had committed the
crime in question.

The trial court allowed the inspector to

testify and thus implicate both defendant and co-defendant but
specifically instructed the jury to disregard the co-defendant's
admission as it applied to the defendant.

The United States

Supreme Court, in reversing the defendant's conviction, held that
"because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite
instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating
extrajudicial statement in determining [defendant's] guilt,
admission of • . . [co-defendant's] confession in . . . [their]

joint trial violated . . . [defendant's] right of crossexamination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment." ^d. at 126.
In Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), the United
States Supreme Court fully discussed the narrow Bruton exception
to the "almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors
follow their instructions." Ijd. at 206.

There the Court stated

that the narrow Bruton exception applied when the "facially
incriminating confession of a nontestifying co-defendant [was]
introduced at their joint trial." Ici. ac 207 (emphasis added).
In Bruton, the co-defendant's testimony both "expressly
implicated]" the defendant and was "powerfully incriminating."
Id. at 208.

In Richardson, the co-defendant's confession was

redacted to omit all reference to the defendant, and the jury was
instructed not to consider the co-defendant's confession against
the defendant.

In upholding the trial court's admission of the

testimony with its limiting instruction, the Court emphasized the
narrowness of the Bruton doctrine.

It held that the

"Confrontation Clause [was] not violated by the admission of a
nontestifying co-defendant's confession with a proper limiting
instruction when . . . the confession [was] redacted to eliminate
not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her
existence." Ld. at 211.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the Bruton and
Richardson analysis of the sixth amendment right to
confrontation.

In State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987), the

Utah Supreme Court interpreted Bruton and declined to apply it to

the facts of that case.

There, inconsistent statements made by

co-defendants at the time of their arrest were admitted into
evidence by the testimony of the arresting police officer.*
Because the statements did not rise to the level of directly
implicating either defendant, the Court did not apply Bruton,
stating that to invoke the Bruton doctrine, "a statement must be
powerfully and facially incriminating with respect to the other
defendant and must directly, rather than indirectly, implicate
the complaining defendant in the commission of the crime." Ld. at
190 (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207, 208 (1987)).
In the instant case, the trial court properly limited
the co-defendant's confession pursuant to Richardson.

The

pertinent portion of Officer Corry's testimony is as follows:
Q. [State] What did Mr. Likes [co-defendant]
tell you then during the interview,
basically?
A. [Deputy Corry] Mr. Likes [co-defendant]
told me that he broke into Fillmore Diesel,
that he used a set of bolt-cutters to cut the
lock, and that he took several items from the
business and placed them in an undisclosed
location somewhere in the Fillmore area.
(T. 222).
No reference, either direct or indirect, was made to
defendant.

The statement neither powerfully nor facially

incriminated defendant.

Therefore, the Bruton doctrine is not

applicable.
In addition to limiting the testimony concerning the
co-defendant's confession, the trial court here expressly
instructed the jury as follows:
In connection with the evidence that has been
received in this case, ladies and gentlemen,

there have [sic] been and offered a statement
attributable to the defendant Likes, to him
individually• You are instructed that
whatever weight or credit you give to that
statement is not to be considered in any way
or fashion in your determination of whether
or not the defendant Nield may be guilty or
innocent.
(T.;340-a) .
The trial court limited the scope of Officer Corry's
testimony concerning the co-defendant's confession to permit no
reference to defendant and specifically instructed the jury that
evidence of the co-defendant's confession could be attributed
only to the co-defendant.

In doing so, the trial court properly

applied the protective legal standards of Richardson.

The

admission of the testimony did not violate defendant's sixth
amendment right to confront witnesses against him.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE
EVIDENCE DEFENDANT CHALLENGES ON APPEAL.
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress arguing that the warrant under which the bolt
cutters were seized did not describe them with sufficient
particularity.

In reviewing the trial court's ruling, this Court

applies the following standard:
In considering the trial court's action
in denying defendant's motion to suppress, we
will not disturb its factual evaluation
unless the findings are clearly erroneous . .
. . The trial judge is in the best position
to assess the credibility and accuracy of the
witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . .
However, in assessing the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon its factual findings,
we afford it no deference but apply a
'correction of error' standard. . . .

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(citations omitted); See also Termunde v. Cook, No, 890495, slip
op. at 2 (Utah Feb. 6, 1990).

But see State v. Cole, 674 P.2d

119, 122 (Utah 1983); State v. Galleqos, 716 P.2d 207, 208-09
(Utah 1985); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1268-69 (Utah 1987)
(which suggest that the "clearly erroneous" standard applied to
the trial court's factual evaluation and its legal conclusion).
In the instant case defendant does not challenge the trial
court's factual findings, as delineated in its ruling on
defendant's motion to suppress and outlined supra.

Therefore,

this court need only assess the trial court's legal conclusion
that the description of items to be seized in the warrant was
constitutionally sufficient.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that search warrants particularly describe articles to
be seized.

However, an exact match between the property seized

and the description in the warrant is not constitutionally
required.

In State v. Galleqos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985),

the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The decision to seize must be judicial,
as opposed to administrative, and the warrant
must be sufficiently particular to guide the
officer to the thing intended to be seized,
thereby minimizing the danger of unwarranted
invasion of privacy. Accordingly, the line
between what is and what is not sufficiently
particular must be drawn with a view to
accomplishment of the constitutional purpose
and necessarily varies with the circumstances
and with the nature of the property to be
seized.
(footnote citations omitted).

See also State v. Anderson 701

P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1988) ("The adequacy of a description in a
1 O

search warrant depends in every instance upon the particular
facts of the case"); Namen v. State, 665 P.2d 557, 560 (Alaska
1983) ("The requisite degree of particularity must be determined
by the totality of the circumstances in each case.").

In the

instant case, Deputy Corry, acting on a tip concerning the
whereabouts of stolen items and fearing that the items might be
disposed of quickly, obtained a search warrant based on the most
complete information he had available to him at the time (R. 7,
60).

A complete inventory of items missing was not available to

him at the time of the search, and his reliance on the warrant in
seizing the bolt cutters was justified.

This conclusion is

consistent with the language from a case cited with approval in
Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 209 n.10:
The amount of particularity required in
naming the items to be seized for a given
warrant to be valid will vary with the
circumstances and with the ability of the
complainants to be specific.
People v. Harmon, 90 Ill.App.3d 753, 755, 46 111.Dec. 27, 29, 413
N.E.2d 467, 469 (1980) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Defendant's repeated assertion that the "shop
equipment, air tools, mig welder, desk calculator, auto tools"
warrant description is "generic," that is, applicable to an
entire class of property, and his reliance on State v. Gallegos
as being factually similar to the instant case are unjustified.
In Gallegos the warrant ordered seizure of "all controlled
substances and stolen property."

There, the Utah Supreme Court,

while holding that the description "stolen property" was
insufficiently particular, stated that general descriptions could

be held sufficient "[in cases] where attendant circumstances
prevented a detailed description from being given." State v.
Galleqos# 712 P.2d at 209, 210 (quoting Namen v. State, 665 P.2d
at 561-62).

Although the warrant description in the instant case

is substantively more particular than in Gallegos, even if it
could be termed "general," it would fall under the Namen
exception just noted.

The trial court's factual findings that

the victim was not able to make an inventory until after the
search and that Deputy Corry proceeded zo obtain a search warrant
with the best information he had are unchallenged by defendant
and are dispositive of the issue.

The trial court did not err in

its legal conclusion denying defendant's motion to suppress.
Even if this Court were to conclude that the search
warrant description was open to challenge, the bolt cutters could
have been seized validly under the plain view doctrine.

As

stated in State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1986), seizure
under the plain view doctrine requires that 1) the officer be
lawfully present; 2) the evidence be in plain view; and 3) the
evidence be clearly incriminating.

The "clearly incriminating"

standard requires an officer to have probable cause to believe
that the item to be seized is evidence of a crime. Id. at 390.
See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987); State v. Babbell,
770 P.2d 987, 993 (Utah 1989).

Here, Deputy Corry was present in

defendant's apartment and searching the closet therein pursuant
to a validly issued search warrant.

The bolt cutters were in

plain view in the closet and Deputy Corry had probable cause to
believe them to be evidence of the crime.

It was Deputy Corry

who had first discovered the burglary of Fillmore Diesel and he
knew that the chain link securing the doors of the shop had been
cut.

Bolt cutters capable of cutting chain link, whether or not

they belonged to the victim, could be properly seized as evidence
of the crime.
Finally, even if this Court were to conclude that the
bolt cutters were erroneously admitted as evidence, enough other
evidence was admitted to sustain defendant's conviction, and the
error would be harmless.

Evidence of defendant's footprints on

the shop floor found on the night of the burglary, stolen items
recovered from the shop behind defendant's apartment, and
testimony by Angie Carpenter that defendant told her he intended
to break into Fillmore Diesel and that he had done so support
defendant's conviction.

No reasonable likelihood exists that

without the admission of the bolt cutters there would have been a
different result.

See State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 129 (Utah

1986) (citing State v. Hutchinson, 655 ?.2d 635 (Utah 1982); Utah
R. Evid. 103(a), Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction
should be affirmed.
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